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Abstract. This article aims to bring together insights from a broad body of recent
literature concerned with the nature, the measurement and policy implications of
benefits and costs of transport. It is argued that, for various reasons, transport
cannot be treated as an ‘ordinary’ economic sector, and the policy implications
of a number of the sector’s peculiarities are addressed. Explicit attention is given
to spatial aspects and network elements, internal and external benefits and costs,
and efficiency aspects and equity considerations in policy making.
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1 Introduction
Transport undoubtedly belongs to the most complicated, and therewith fascinating
economic sectors. The transport sector exhibits a number of specific features that
renders common economic wisdom of only limited use in the assessment of the
sectors’ costs and benefits. Nevertheless, such an assessment is an important
input for the design of transport policies based on solid economic principles. A
number of these peculiarities of transport will be addressed in the present article.
The article aims at providing a broad overview of the issues surrounding the
benefits and costs of transport, and their policy implications.
A first important characteristic is that transport demand is usually a ‘derived
demand’, serving to satisfy spatial mismatches between demand and supply on
various markets: goods markets for freight transport; labour and housing markets
for peak-hour commuters’ traffic, etc. Therefore, the benefits of, for instance,
infrastructure supply cannot be seen in isolation of its interaction with the entire
economic system, nor in isolation of its spatial structure, and – since infrastructure
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usually lasts for decades – nor in disregard of the dynamic behaviour of these
two.
Secondly, the costs and benefits of the entire transport system arise both
through the supply and existence of infrastructure, and through its usage. Al-
though it is evident that these two elements are closely connected, the distinction
is important as it may have important consequences for the specification of poli-
cies. For instance, the public benefits of infrastructure in terms of accessibility
are often mistaken as ‘external benefits’ of transport, thus casting doubt on the
necessity of regulating transport’s external costs, such as environmental impacts.
These benefits of accessibility, in turn, are realized and revealed only through
the usage of infrastructure. This means that, whereas a large share of the costs
of infrastructure provision are often concentrated in time (i.e., the construction
phase), the benefits are to be reaped over a much longer, future period – implying
an imbalance in the timing of the costs and benefits of transport infrastructure.
Thirdly, transport activities themselves often give rise to a variety of costs,
which can be internal (fuel, time) or external (’inter-sectoral’: pollution, noise,
accidents; and ‘intra-sectoral’: accidents, congestion) in nature; which can be
variable (fuel) or fixed (purchase of cars, vehicle taxes) for individual trips;
which can be instantaneous (congestion) or cumulative (CO2), which can have
a local (noise) or a global (CO2) impact, and so forth. Hence, it is unlikely
that an unregulated transport market will be efficient in terms of accomplishing
optimality in terms of, for instance, total mobility generated, the modal split, or
the spatial and temporal (peak versus off-peak) distribution.
Of course, more peculiarities of transport can be mentioned – the fact that
it takes place in a network environment, the mutually causal relationship with
spatial economic development, the quasi-public character of infrastructure – but
it will be clear that the assessment of the costs and benefits of transport provides
an area of slippery ice. Nevertheless, we wish to tread upon it, and we will
discuss a number of issues that complicate the assessment of transport’s benefits
and costs, and may therefore complicate the design of transport policies. In the
next section, we will discuss issues related to the benefits of transport. Apart from
considering the benefits per se, we will also pay attention to the distribution of
benefits and related questions of equity. Section 3 is concerned with the cost
side of transport, and we will pay attention to issues of equity and the related
question concerning the social feasibility of transport policies. Section 4 offers
some concluding remarks.
2 Benefits in transport systems
The benefits a society derives from a transport system arise through the usage
of a (number of) transport network(s). Usually, the decisions of whether (1) to
supply the infrastructure, and (2) to use it are taken by different actors. The latter
decision is usually taken by individual agents (with, in case of public transport,
the operator acting as an intermediate, offering certain services depending on the
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availability of infrastructure and the individual agents’ demand). Although the
possibility of private supply and exploitation of infrastructure increasingly gains
interest (Nijkamp and Rienstra 1995), central, regional or local governments are
normally responsible for the first decision. An economic rationale for the public
provision is that transport infrastructure, especially when used at levels below
which congestion sets in, exhibits non-rivalry in consumption, and, on the basis
of cost considerations, non-excludability (especially for roads). These are the two
standard criteria distinguishing public goods from private goods (Varian 1992).
However, since these two criteria only apply with limited validity, most analysts
agree that transport infrastructure actually is a ‘quasi-collective’ good.
Clearly, the benefits of infrastructure supply and usage are narrowly related:
without usage, there are no benefits of infrastructure supply (apart, perhaps, from
an ‘option value’), and the total benefits of infrastructure can thus be seen as
the total net benefits of the usage (net of the costs of usage) over the life of
the infrastructure. We therefore start this section by discussing the benefits of
transport.
2.1 Benefits and the derived demand for transport
In ‘ordinary’ goods markets, the benefits derived from consumption can quite
accurately be described by consumers’ surpluses, derived from Marshallian de-
mand curves (although from a strictly theoretical perspective, Hicksian measures
may deserve preference; see Varian 1992). For the benefits of transport, it is in
this respect important to recognize the derived character of the demand. Often, it
is not the consumption of transport services itself that yields benefits, but rather
the possibility to demand or supply certain goods (for freight transport) or ser-
vices (for passenger transport) at different locations. In such cases, the benefits
of transport are actually to be found in the increase of consumers’ and/or pro-
ducers’ surpluses in these markets. This means that for a given infrastructure, the
benefits of its usage often arise in other markets, and cannot be seen in isolation
of the factors that determine the demand for transport.
This can be illustrated, for the case of freight transport, with the aid of a
simple spatial price equilibrium (SPE) model, first presented in a seminal paper
by Samuelson (1952) and later on extensively studied and further developed by
Takayama and others (see Takayama and Judge 1971; and Takayama and Labys
1986). Figure 1 gives the diagrammatic representation of SPE in a back-to-back
diagram. Two nodes A and B are distinguished (by subscripts), and the local
demand (D) and supply (S ) curves can be used to derive equilibrium prices
and quantities supplied (Q) and demanded (Y ), in autarky (superscript A) and
with trade (T ). To derive the latter, for both nodes R an excess demand/supply
curves XR(ER) is constructed by horizontal subtraction of the supply curve from
the demand curve, where E gives the net export. Using that in equilibrium, the
price difference between the regions should be equal to the transport costs t , the
after-trade equilibrium can be found where EA = −EB and |PTA − PTB | = t .
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Fig. 1. The benefits of transport in an SPE model
In Fig. 1, we find PTA −PTB = t , and QTB − Y TB = EB = −EA = Y TA −QTA : node
B is the net exporter. The two shaded areas give the net benefits of transport,
which are made up from changes in consumers’ and producers’ surpluses. Both
nodes gain, as they should with voluntary trade. However, it can be noted that
in node A the consumers benefit whereas the producers lose, while the opposite
occurs in node B. It is relatively easy to see that for this system, the demand for
transport can be found by vertical subtraction of XB from XA. The relevant range
lies between the vertical axis and the intersection of the two curves. Hence,
although the demand is derived, the principle that the area under the demand
curve for transport gives total benefits still applies.
The benefits of transport can thus often be thought of as the benefits of the
increased local specialization it enables. Although it is of course hard to imagine
what our contemporary societies would look like in absolute absence of transport
in order to determine the ‘total benefits of transport’ (note also that transport is
very broadly defined in Fig. 1, including all possible modes of movement of
goods and persons), the above principle can also be used to assess the benefits of
marginal changes in the transportation system. The above SPE model is probably
the most simple spatio-economic system with transport that one could think of,
but nevertheless, it already demonstrates a number of important complications
that are associated with the evaluation of transport infrastructure investments
(which could be represented by a reduction in transport costs t).
In the first place, an estimation of the benefits of such an investment often
requires an estimation of its impact on other markets in the spatio-economic
system considered. In particular, the benefits of such projects are likely to be
spread out over various markets related to the transport market. However, this
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does not imply that the benefits are ‘external’; note in particular that for the
attainment of the optimum in Fig. 1, market forces can be relied upon and no
Pigouvian subsidization is required. Secondly, in contrast to many other types of
public investments, where often only ‘winners’ and ‘non-affected’ are involved
(leaving aside the question of tax raising and feelings of jealousy), transport
infrastructure improvements are likely to cause some agents to be better off
(consumers in A and producers in B), but also some to be worse off (producers
in A and consumers in B). The incidence of gains and losses over different
interest groups may thus vary over space. This means that equity considerations,
and issues of social feasibility are likely to be important determinants for the
viability of infrastructure policies.
2.2 Infrastructure and spatial dynamics
In this section we will focus on some main aspects of spatial dynamic conse-
quences of infrastructure supply. Broader reviews can be found in Vickerman
(1991), Rietveld and Nijkamp (1993) and Rietveld (1994). As shown in Table
1, transport infrastructure investments have both temporary and non-temporary
effects on the economy. Infrastructure supply has a broad range of effects which
are spatially differentiated. In the present section we will give a discussion of a
number of them, including: (a) construction phase effects, (b) trade, (c) changes
in distribution systems, (d) productivity, (e) housing and labour markets, (f) mo-
nopolistic price setting.
Table 1. Temporary and non-temporary effects of transport infrastructure investments
Demand side Supply side
Temporary effects Construction effects –
crowding-out
Non-temporary effects operations and maintenance effect on productivity, trade,
land use, etc.
2.2.1 Construction phase effects
A major temporary effect concerns the stimulation of employment and income
during the construction phase via the demand side. A straightforward tool to use
is input-output analysis. However, attention should be paid to the question how
the infrastructure is financed. A tax increase or an increase in interest rates due
to government borrowing on the capital market would have a negative impact on
consumption or investments which would counter the initial demand stimulating
effect of government spending. Such crowding-out effects are often ignored in
regional or urban studies where the infrastructure project is considered ‘small’
compared with the size of the national economy. However, if local projects are
financed by means of local financial resources (local taxes), one should of course
144 T.R. Lakshmanan et. al
take into account the impacts of these taxes on investment behaviour of firms in
the area concerned.
In a spatial sense the construction phase is interesting, because the infras-
tructure project will be partly carried out by local construction sector workers.
Depending on the level of sophistication of the work also a good part of non-local
workers may be needed. In addition, spatial effects in the construction materials
industry and other suppliers may take place in regions far away from the region.
2.2.2 Trade
The effects of transport infrastructure on trade have already been discussed by
means of a simple two region model in Sect. 2.1. Of course this is a very partial
model, since only one market was distinguished. Also for more complicated
interregional trade models the main conclusion remains true that improvement of
infrastructure, leading to lower transport costs, implies tendencies towards local
specialization and larger trade flows. Much will depend on the extent to which
factor markets are flexible and production factors are mobile. With highly mobile
production factors responding to differences in factor payments substantial shifts
in economic activity may occur.
Of special importance are economies of scale in production. When scale
economies exist, regions with an initial advantage may benefit much more from
a reduction in transport costs than other regions (Krugman 1991) leading to a
process of ‘cumulative causation’ (Myrdal 1957).
2.2.3 Spatial organization of distribution
Above we noted that infrastructure improvement leads to a reduction in trans-
port costs and hence affects trade flows. A closer look reveals that infrastructure
investments may have various effects in the way production, transport and dis-
tribution are organized. Infrastructure provision may in principle affect choices
concerning matters such as: route choice (including port choice), mode choice,
location of distribution centres, number of levels in distribution structure, choice
of logistical strategies, etc. McKinnon (1996) mentions three types of ‘reorganiza-
tional benefits’ of transport infrastructure supply that are of particular importance:
market expansion, spatial concentration and tighter scheduling.
Market expansion may be quite important in less developed regions where
the improvement of infrastructure makes the exploitation of natural resources
feasible. It may also have large effects when island economies get fixed links.
Note further that due to various factors (such as limits on driving hours of
truck drivers, and the wish of business travellers to return home on the same
day) in some cases even a modest improvement of infrastructure may induce
a substantial reduction in transport costs, implying improved opportunities for
reaching markets further away.
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Spatial concentration is the result of an adjustment of the optimal plant size
as a result of a trade-off between size dependent production costs and transport
costs of inputs and outputs. These scale effects also play an important role in
warehousing.
Examples of tighter scheduling are the just-in-time principle in manufactur-
ing and quick-response principles in the retail sector. The application of these
principles presupposes the existence of a well developed and reliable infrastruc-
ture. These principles induce a decrease in the stocks and an increase in freight
traffic, although, as noted by McKinnon (1996) due to various consolidation and
collection schemes, this increase is smaller than often thought.
The general conclusion is that improvement of transport infrastructure does
not only lead to larger trade flows as indicated earlier, but also to a more trans-
port intensive way of organization of production and distribution having distinct
effects on the spatial distribution of production and distribution activities.
2.2.4 Productivity
Transport infrastructure can be considered as a stock of a certain type of capital
available to a region or a country. A general formulation of a production function
for sector i in region r , with various types of infrastructure is:
Qir = fir (Lir , Kir ; IAr , . . . , INr ) (1)
where Qir is value added in sector i , region r , Lir employment in sector i , region
r , Kir private capital in sector i , region r , IAr , . . ., INr infrastructure of various
types in region r .
This function indicates that production takes place by means of combining
labour, private capital and infrastructure. The relationships between these inputs
may have a substitutive or complementary character. For example, with better
roads a transport firm needs fewer trucks and fewer drivers to reach the same level
of production (substitution). On the other hand, with broader canals a transport
firm may use larger ships (complementarity) so that the number of workers can
be reduced (substitution).
It is not so easy to take into account the network properties of transport
infrastructure in the production function approach. One thing one can do is to
distinguish various types of transport infrastructure according to their spatial
range: intraregional, interregional and possibly international. A related problem
with infrastructure is that its impact may transcend the boundaries of regions. A
certain region may benefit from a university or airport, even though these facilities
are not located in the region itself. This problem of spatial spill-overs may be
solved by using the concept of accessibility of certain types of infrastructure in the
production function (see, e.g., Johansson 1992). An alternative approach to study
the role of infrastructure in production processes is to use cost functions (Elhance
and Lakshmanan 1988, Seitz 1993). The productivity impacts in empirical studies
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may vary strongly among economic sectors (Fukuchi 1978; Blum 1982) and
between various transport modes (Blum 1982; Andersson et al. 1989).
Production functions have been applied at various spatial levels: national,
regional, metropolitan. Their orientation can thus be characterized as macro to
meso. Production functions give an aggregate view of the contribution of in-
frastructure to productivity. Note that this approach does not cover all welfare
aspects of infrastructure supply: the impact on the consumers is not taken into
account. Due to the aggregate nature of the production functions it can hardly be
used to give an ex-ante prediction of specific projects. Only when the network
properties of infrastructure are adequately represented in the production func-
tion, this approach may become useful for this purpose. A strong point of the
production function approach is that it represents the sum of direct and indirect
productivity effects, though in an implicit way.
Note that in this production function an increase in the infrastructure stock
leads to a shift in productivity: it does not lead to a permanently higher growth
rate. Such a permanent increase in the growth rate might be present, however
when transport infrastructure investments lead to a higher level of knowledge
production – for instance, through improvement of existing technologies, or de-
velopment of new technologies during the project – which would affect the
growth level according to endogenous growth theory.
2.2.5 Housing and labour market
It is conventional wisdom that improvement of infrastructure leads to better
functioning of labour markets. More workers can be recruited within reasonable
commuting distances leading to a reduction of unemployment and vacancies due
to spatial frictions and a better match between the demand and supply side of
the labour market. In the long run the effects are more diffuse, however. Urban
economic theory predicts that a decrease in transport costs will lead to a shift
in settlement patters towards a more diffuse pattern of land use (Fujita 1989).
This will lead to an increase of commuting distances. This means that next to
a reduction of spatial frictions indeed implying an improvement of productivity
of firms due to improved spatial organization and distribution mechanisms men-
tioned above, there is also a welfare effect on households because they can now
live in a more spacious dwelling and in a nicer environment. There is ample evi-
dence that commuting distances in many countries have increased considerably as
a response to the improvement of transport infrastructure. These longer distances
are not so much the consequence of new recruitments at a longer distance, but
much more of voluntary moves of households who relocate to another dwelling
(see, for example, Rouwendal and Rietveld 1994). It is probable therefore that
the welfare improving effects for households are larger than the productivity
improving effects for firms.
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2.2.6 Monopolistic (monopsonistic) prices
A final point of interest is that improved infrastructure leads to an increase in the
number of suppliers (or demanders) in the market. This has a favourable effect
on consumer welfare because it reduces the probability of collusive behaviour
between suppliers. Large improvements may take place in the more extreme case
that areas are dependent on only one trader, as may be the case in isolated regions
in developing countries (Johnson 1970).
2.3 Distributive and generative effects
An important feature of transport infrastructure is that improvement of infrastruc-
ture will generally lead to both ‘distributive’ and ‘generative’ effects. Distributive
effects occur when positive impacts of infrastructure improvements are compen-
sated for by negative impacts elsewhere in the economy (both in a sectoral and in
a spatial sense). Generative effects, on the other hand, refer to the net (welfare)
improvement that accrues to the total spatial system affected by the investment.
This distinction is important, in particular because the generative effect of an
investment may be overestimated when the study area is too narrowly defined.
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Fig. 2. Network effects of an improvement in link 1 (between A and B)
An important reason for this feature of infrastructure is its network character.
Improvements (and construction) of links will usually not only affect that link
itself, but will also affect other links in the network, and therewith welfare in the
nodes not directly served by the improved link. Figure 2 (based on an example
in Button 1993) shows this for a very simple network with one origin (A) and
two possible destinations (B and C). For the determination of the benefits of an
improvement in link 1 between A and B, it is necessary to distinguish three groups
of users: those who do not change their behaviour (groups Ti ; i denotes route);
those who will switch from choosing destination C before the improvement, to
B afterwards, due to its increased accessibility (group R); and newly generated
traffic (groups Gi ). These groups together determine the change in total traffic
for both routes (Wi −Vi ). Especially when the network was originally congested,
none of the groups will generally be of zero size.
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Fig. 3. Impacts and total benefits on a two-link network owing to an improvement on one of its links
Figure 3 shows the economic equilibrating principles underlying the changes
in traffic volumes (from Vi to Wi ). Di denotes the demand curve for link i , Ci
the cost curve (which are rising due to congestion effects), and primes denote
the situation after the improvement. The cost curve C1 shifts down owing to the
improvement; D1 shifts outwards and D2 inwards due to route switching of group
R, equilibrium user costs are reduced from ci to ki on both routes, and usage
increases on link 1 and decreases on link 2. Assuming linear demand relations,
and a linear cross-demand relation, the total benefits of the improvement are
given by the so-called ‘rule of half’, stating that the benefits of an improvement
in a network is equal to the sum (over all links) of the average usage (before and
after the improvement) times the decrease in equilibrium cost on that link (see
also Button 1993):
I∑
i
1
2
· [Vi + Wi ] · [ci − ki ] (2)
(this expression carries over to larger networks of I links). In Fig. 3, these benefits
are indicated as the shaded areas.
After ‘closing’ the above network by adding link BC, we find the network
given in Fig. 4, which can be used to explore the network implications of in-
frastructure improvements somewhat further. Consider a model of interregional
trade where the share of imports into region j from a certain region i depends
negatively on transport costs between i and j relative to an indicator of aggregate
transport costs from all regions to region j . Then, in this spatial configuration
an improvement on link A-B can be shown to have an unambiguously negative
effect on the trade share of region C (Amano and Fujita 1970). For the regions
A and B, the effect on trade shares is not clear, as this depends on the extent
to which the loss on the home market can be compensated for by an increased
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Fig. 4. Response of trade shares to transport cost reductions in a three-region network owing to an
improvement on link A-B
penetration on the other region’s market (Rietveld and Nijkamp 1993). Note that
this model is concerned with trade shares only; when total production changes,
and especially economies (or dis-economies) of scale occur, the picture becomes
more complicated.
It may be clear from these examples that, even in very simple networks,
improvements in infrastructure will generally have an impact not only on the
links and in the nodes or regions directly involved, but will often have effects
also on other links in the network and on other regions and nodes. The distinc-
tion between ‘distributive’ and ‘generative’ effects is therefore indeed important.
Moreover, these interdependencies imply that the impacts of certain infrastruc-
ture improvements not only vary over space and sectors within the area directly
concerned, but may often carry over to (much) larger areas. Generally, areas di-
rectly involved will benefit (although this certainly need not hold for all interest
groups within these areas; compare Fig. 1), whereas the indirect effects for other
areas may well be negative (compare Fig. 4). This implies that infrastructure in-
vestments can be seen as a strategic game, where improvements in one area may
induce the need for other areas to follow.
A central government, deciding on its infrastructure policies, faces the
dilemma that accessibility is both an absolute and a relative concept. Therefore,
favouring certain regions may have perverse impacts on other regions (relatively
and absolutely speaking). Although the distribution of the total benefits of a
rationally selected infrastructure investment will of course not be a zero-sum
game, trade-offs between economic efficiency and (spatial and sectoral) equity
in infrastructure policies are often unavoidable.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the cost-benefit type of analysis con-
sidered above is often performed under the assumption of first-best conditions
applying throughout the economic system. As soon as this is not the case, such
analyses may become a lot more complicated. In particular because unpriced
external costs often exist in transport (see also Sect. 3.3), this problem should be
taken serious in cost-benefit analyses in transport. For reasons of space, we will
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not discuss this issue here; important contributions on this topic can be found for
instance in Wheaton (1978), Wilson (1983) and d’Ouville and McDonald (1990).
2.4 External benefits to transport?
From the above list of (spatial) effects it is clear that changes in transport may
bring about a large number of changes in the economy, many of them having
welfare improving effects. An important question is to what extent these are
taken into account in an appropriate way in standard cost benefit analysis. Are
they fully reflected by the consumer surpluses as shown in Figs. 1 and 3? This
question has been addressed among others by Willeke (1992) who claims that
there are substantial benefits owing to infrastructure (road) improvement, and
Rothengatter (1994) who claims that such benefits if they exist at all would be
small. The political importance of this debate lies in the fact that road transport
is paying substantial Pigouvian taxes in many countries to correct for its external
costs (see Sect. 3). Therefore, if there would exist external benefits to (road)
transport this would imply that there is a case for subsidies to infrastructure use,
or at least a reduction in the tax levels.
Indeed it is true that transport infrastructure provision has effects that are
much wider than only take place in the transport sector itself. Without infras-
tructure our economies would collapse. This, however, is not the issue at stake
here. Two important aspects should be considered.
First, we should not focus on the average contribution of transport to our
welfare, but on the marginal. When discussing a subsidy for infrastructure use
because of positive externalities, the relevant question is not how large the welfare
gain is when we compare an economy without and with (road) transport; instead,
the relevant question is what is the marginal change in social welfare given a
marginal change in the number of kilometres driven (compare the difference
between the average and marginal utility of drinking water: the first is close
to infinite because life is almost impossible without it, the last is close to zero
because nobody cares about another glass of water).
Second, it should be checked whether in the procedure of estimating benefits
of infrastructure improvements via consumer surpluses as shown above there is
a neglect of certain benefits which take place outside the transport sector. For
most of the examples given above it is clear that there is no need to worry. For
example, in the trade case dealt with in Sect. 2.1 we find that the total benefits
due to a reorientation of production and consumption are fully reflected by the
area under the demand curve for transport.
External benefits would imply that the total benefits of the use of infrastructure
are larger than the willingness to pay of the immediate user. Thus there must be
another party who gains without there being a payment by this beneficiary to the
actor using the transport infrastructure. A closer look reveals that in the relevant
cases discussed in Sect. 2.1 such a payment always takes place, and hence there
are no externalities involved.
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However, some additional cases can be listed where positive marginal exter-
nalities might be present. We will discuss them in some detail below.
Plane (or car-) spotters. These consumers indeed get a welfare increase from
observing planes or cars without a financial transfer. The economic importance
of this phenomenon is limited and often negligible.
Trips with a social purpose. Many trips give positive utility to those who get
a visit. The visitor pays the costs of the visit, and the person visited does not
compensate him for it. As indicated by Verhoef (1996) these trips are charac-
terized by reciprocity (the compensation of the visit is a counter visit), or by
altruism (the visitor includes the utility of the person visited into his utility). In
the first case there is no external element involved, in the second there may be
an external benefit, e.g, when the person visited feels that his utility does not
receive sufficient weight in the visitor’s utility. In principle, the person visited
could reveal his willingness to pay to the visitor by offering a compensation (for
example in the form of a good meal), so why would the government subsidize
the visitor’s transport costs? Thus, this does not provide a convincing case of a
positive externality. Note further that some people may dislike visits of certain
persons so that one would arrive at a negative externality. It is clear that this
example is in general too weak and unimportant to serve as a case for a subsidy
to social visits in (road) transport, let alone to (road) transport trips at large.
Emergency services (police, ambulance, fire-brigade). These services may
save lives and properties; they are mentioned by Rothengatter (1994) as one of
the few possible exceptions to the rule that positive externalities do not exist
in the use of transport infrastructure. Without a proper transport system these
services cannot function. Does this imply that these services deserve a subsidy?
Note that demand for these service trips is (almost) price inelastic: the willingness
to pay for it is very high, so that for the relevant price ranges of transport costs the
demand can be considered as fixed. In most institutional settings the services are
offered by the public sector and the consumer does not pay. Expenses are usually
covered by taxes. The risk that the fire-brigade will not show up because its
budget does not allow it to pay for the use of the road is negligible. We conclude
that the willingness to pay for these emergency services is high; this will be
reflected by a relatively large contribution to consumer surplus implying a strong
case for the construction of the infrastructure. However, there is no externality
involved so that this is not a solid case for a subsidy on infrastructure use. A
paradoxical result of making road use cheaper would be that it may increase
congestion implying a deterioration of the quality of emergency services.
National security. Transport infrastructure may fulfil an important strategic
role for the national defense sector. This holds for roads as well as airports, ports,
and railways; the latter especially in the past. Considerations of national security
may and do certainly play a role in discussions concerning, for instance, privitiza-
tion of national transport infrastructures, but for the same reasons as given above
in the context of emergency services, the benefits of increased national security
152 T.R. Lakshmanan et. al
due to better infrastructure1 do not imply that ‘normal’ use of this infrastructure
should be subsidized at the margin.
Image effects related to infrastructure. For example, port A becomes a more
attractive transfer seaport when it has a railway connection to the hinterland; even
when the railway will not be used (because existing water and road connections
with the hinterland are appropriate and cheaper), it improves the status of A
so that its market share as a transfer port increases. If the status of hinterland
connections really matters in the decision of container lines to include port A
into their operations, an investment into a railway line may indeed be profitable.
From a welfare economic point of view it is most probably not a good investment,
because it is difficult to see how it will yield additional consumer surplus. Since
the status effect is assumed to be independent of the volume of traffic on the line,
there is no reason to subsidize the use of the line. There are external elements
here but they do not relate to the use of the infrastructure, and therefore there is
no need to bother about subsidizing its use. This is an extreme example of a status
effect. A more realistic example would be that the railway line will be heavily
underutilized but again there is no reason in that case to subsidize its use, even if
the regional or national authorities decide to subsidize the investment for spatial
competitive reasons. Note that, if regional or national governments engage in this
type of competition based on image effects, the result may well be that in the
end everybody is worse off due to excessive investments in socially unwarranted
infrastructure.
We conclude that no clear and significant case of a positive externality of
infrastructure usage has been identified. Important sources of confusion seem to
be (1) that transport has many (positive) effects outside the transport sector itself;
however, as shown above these effects are properly represented in the consumer
surplus of the transport demand curve, and (2) the benefits of infrastructure supply
as outlined in Sect. 2.2 are often mistaken to be the same as ‘external benefits
of transport’. Note, in particular, that the total net social benefits of a certain
infrastructure investment are maximized when its usage is optimized through
a proper internalization of the external costs resulting from its usage. There is
no need to worry that there would be an underinvestment or underutilization
of transport infrastructure accordingly. There is no solid basis for a subsidy to
infrastructure use.
It appears that the major issue should not be whether cost-benefit analysis
overlooks certain (external) benefits of infrastructure. The real problem is that
cost-benefit analysis should be based on properly estimated demand functions.
The demand functions should reflect the various indirect effects mentioned in
Sect. 2.2. Priority is needed for research to improve integrated ex-ante impact
studies of transport infrastructure. This does not imply that cost benefit analysis
itself is without problems, but the problems seem to be located at other places:
1 For the sake of the argument, being in search of possible external benefits, we assume here that
a better infrastructure does increase national security on the whole. It is of course often the case that,
once a country is occupied, the enemy benefits from the infrastructure.
Benefits and costs of transport 153
the way negative externalities are valued, and the possibility to take into account
(spatial) equity problems (see Sect. 2.3)
2.5 Infrastructure and employment
The main focal points of this article concern the costs and benefits of transport
infrastructure use. Cost-benefit analysis provides a useful framework to analyze
these effects in a policy oriented context concerning investment decisions and
pricing. However, cost benefit analysis also often meets criticism. Some of these
are indeed not easy to overcome (lack of knowledge how to value external effects,
how to deal with equity issues). Another criticism of cost-benefit analysis is that
it is too soft in the sense that its outcomes depend strongly on welfare effects such
as time gains of persons travelling; instead one would like to concentrate on the
effects of infrastructure on the business sector. The basis of this criticism seems
to be that only effects that can be measured via the GDP are important. In our
opinion this is a risky view, that does not sufficiently recognize the importance
of infrastructure for the consumer.
Another issue concerns the employment effects of infrastructure investments.
It is striking that especially local and regional governments base their argumen-
tation in favour of employment effects. Obviously it is easier to communicate
to the general public that a project will generate 500 jobs than that its internal
rate of return is 9%. A question is to what extent projects may be expected to
lead to identical rankings when cost benefit analysis is used, compared with em-
ployment based rankings. The answer is that there is little reason to expect that
the two criteria run parallel. The first reason is that the employment approach
ignores the positive effects on consumers, which often play a dominant role at
the benefit side. The second reason is that productivity gains as can be studied
by means of the production function approach (Sect. 2.2) may have a negative
effect on employment. The background is that substitution effects would lead
to a decrease in demand for employment. One cannot be sure a priori whether
such a substitution effect will be compensated by a positive output effect. This
depends on the extent to which the productivity increase leads to a decrease in
prices of the various goods produced and on their price elasticities.
The concern about employment can be understood from the situation of
chronic unemployment experienced by many economies during the past 25 years.
Indeed, in this case the use of the current wage does not reflect the opportunity
costs of labour. Many more workers would be prepared to work for the cur-
rent wage. Therefore a lower shadow price for labour should be employed. This
holds true for both the temporary employment generated during the project and
the permanent employment effect (if there is any) after the project. Our conclu-
sion is that in situations of chronic unemployment cost-benefit analysis should be
based on a shadow price of labour which is lower than the market price. If this
is not taken care of, it underestimates the net benefits of infrastructure supply.
However, in situations of more balanced labour markets there is less reason to
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focus on employment. From a welfare economic viewpoint, employment is not
a goal per se and it makes no sense to increase employment without taking into
account its welfare implications in terms of leisure and consumption opportuni-
ties. In economies plagued by overheated labour markets one would even like to
see infrastructure projects of a labour saving nature.
We conclude that in situations of chronic unemployment, the use of the wages
observed on the market leads to an underestimate of the net benefits of projects.
This provides an argument to pay special attention to them in impact studies.
Since also equity aspects and (intangible) environmental effects have to be dealt
with, we arrive at the conclusion that multicriteria analysis as a tool for a sys-
tematic analysis of conflicting criteria is a welcome complement to the standard
cost-benefit approaches (see Van Pelt 1994).
Summing up, the benefits of infrastructure supply and investment (that is,
offering an increase in supply) consist of the (discounted) stream of the net
benefits of transport. These, in turn, are often hard to measure, as transport
often is a derived demand. Accessibility as such yields no benefits; only when
it is used, through spatial interaction, are the benefits to be reaped.2 For the net
benefits gains in freight transport, this means that one would have to predict
the dynamic behaviour of a spatial economic system, often much larger than
the area in which the investment takes place due to network effects, to assess
the benefits of infrastructure improvements. Moreover, a complicating factor is
that the incidence of benefits will usually strongly vary over space and over
interest groups, and that some groups may actually be made worse off due to
infrastructure improvements. Whereas the benefits for freight transport can be
monetized by predicting the impact on regional economic growth, the benefits for
passenger transport are often even more difficult to assess. Once the improvement
is in existence, however, the rule of half may give an ex post impression of the
net benefits enjoyed. Finally, there is no a priori reason to believe that market
forces would not be able to realize the benefits of infrastructure improvements. In
other words, the benefits of transport are market internal, and there is no need for
Pigouvian subsidization of transport. Nevertheless, but not in contradiction with
the foregoing remark, these benefits often manifest themselves on other markets
than the transport market itself, through, for instance, increased efficiency in
production. The benefits of infrastructure provision, on the other hand, often
have a public character, which justifies public intervention in the provision of
transport infrastructure.
3 Costs in transport systems
Also on the cost side, and actually even more clearly than on the demand side,
a distinction can be made between costs of infrastructure supply and costs of its
2 Hence, pure ‘existence values’, which in environmental economics are often distinguished from
the more traditional ‘use values’, seem to have no specific relevance for transport infrastructures, and
we would not advice transport policy makers to base investment decisions on such considerations.
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usage. Although we will pay more attention to the latter in what follows, we also
wish to highlight a few issues surrounding the former in the next sub-section.
3.1 Costs of infrastructure supply
The costs of infrastructure supply are usually subdivided into costs made during
the construction, and costs which are subsequently incurred over the lifetime of
the project (for instance, maintenance costs). For road infrastructure, the latter are
usually in the order of 1-2% (per year) of the former. Along with the public good
argument and the above discussed (spatial) equity considerations in addition to
issues of economic efficiency, this lumpiness of costs of infrastructure supply, as
well as the uncertainty of future returns (should there be pricing on it), are often
seen as important additional reasons for public provision.
An important question concerning the costs of infrastructure supply is by
whom these costs should be borne. Traditionally, it is ‘the tax payer’ (sometimes
partly the payer of vehicle ownership taxes) who will pay for the publicly pro-
vided infrastructure. In such cases, there is no direct link, or sometimes even
no link at all, between those who pay for the infrastructure and those who use
it. On the basis of principles of fairness, it could be asked whether the link be-
tween using the infrastructure and paying for its costs should not be as close as
possible. This principle is used, for instance, in Scandinavian toll-rings, where
the main purpose of the tolls is often to raise revenues for financing the local
road infrastructure. The question then becomes whether the purpose of pricing
on infrastructure should be cost recovery or regulation of externalities. One of
the most famous results in transport economics, found by Mohring and Harwitz
(1962), however, is that under certain assumptions – in particular constant re-
turns to scale in user cost and capacity construction – it can be shown that the
revenues of optimal congestion pricing are just sufficient to cover the cost of op-
timal capacity supply. This means that these two possible goals of pricing need
not be as conflicting as one might think at first sight.
Despite its appeal, it is clear that the above principle will in practice be
difficult to apply, in particular because of the already mentioned lumpiness of
transport infrastructure investments. Hirschmann (1958) already pointed out that
one will often see relatively long periods of excess demand or supply. Moreover,
the question towards scale effects in user costs and capacity construction also
has not been settled yet (see Small 1992a).
3.2 Internal costs of infrastructure usage
For a discussion of the costs of infrastructure usage, we confine ourselves to the
case of road transport; firstly for reasons of space, secondly because it is the
most important mode of inland transport, and thirdly because it is probably also
the most intriguing one.
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One of the most important distinctions one can make in the costs of road
usage is between internal and external costs. The former are incurred by the
individual road user herself, whereas the latter are those costs which are posed
upon others, without a market taking care of the optimal allocation of these
costs (see Verhoef 1994, for a formal definition and discussion of the external
costs of road transport). This does not mean that all internal costs are actually
priced: for instance, an important element in the private costs of road transport
is given by time costs, which have a clear economic value, but no market price
(note, however, that extra time losses posed upon other road users, in case of
congestion, are indeed external).
Within the class of internal costs, a further distinction can be made between
fixed costs, related to vehicle ownership, and variable costs, related to specific
trips or to kilometres driven. In a standard neo-classical optimization framework,
a road user would decide to purchase a car and carry the fixed costs over its
lifetime (including fixed vehicle taxes, insurance taxes, and so forth) if the dis-
counted stream of expected net benefits (net of variable costs) of individually
optimal road usage – for each trip based on the marginal private benefits ≥
marginal private cost rule – exceeds the fixed costs of car ownership. In princi-
ple, from the viewpoint of economic efficiency, there is nothing wrong with this,
and pleas for the variabilization of fixed costs, for instance through ‘car sharing’,
make economic sense only if it is taken as a second-best alternative to optimal
regulation of external costs of road transport.
Where efficiency in private optimization actually may fail is in the perception
of variable cost. It is a well known result of transport studies that many persons
are badly informed about the costs and benefits of transport alternatives (see
Blaas et al. 1993). For example, car users are not aware of the full monetary
costs of a trip. Apart from ‘correctly’ ignoring the fixed costs when deciding
to make a certain trip, also wear and tear, and even fuel costs are sometimes
overlooked; the only remaining cost component considered being the out of
pocket costs for parking and presumably the time costs. It is not straightforward,
within the standard economic framework, whether governments should actively
intervene when people choose to ‘mislead’ themselves (there should be some
benefits from doing so, otherwise people would not do so). It is likely, however,
that a policy of education and information provision in such cases may enhance
economic efficiency. Nevertheless, this problem would probably be considered
as less serious if the induced extra vehicle-kilometres would not damage society
through the external costs caused.
3.3 External costs of infrastructure usage: efficiency versus equity3
Road transport causes many types of external costs. Usually, at least the following
main categories are distinguished: environmental pollution, road accidents, noise
annoyance and congestion. These external costs of road transport can in fact be
3 Sections 3.3 and 3.4 draw heavily on Lakshmanan et al. (1997).
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subdivided into intra- and inter-sectoral externalities. The former are externalities
that road users pose upon one-another (e.g., congestion, part of the costs of
accidents). The latter are posed upon society at large (environmental externalities,
noise annoyance, another part of the external accident costs). The relevance of
these two types in a way depends on the viewpoint taken. From the viewpoint of
economic efficiency, both are relevant for the regulation of road transport (both
should be accounted for in optimal Pigouvian taxes based on marginal external
cost pricing; see Fig. 5 below). From the viewpoint of equity, on the other hand,
especially inter-sectoral externalities are important, as these make up the ‘unpaid
bill’ that road usage poses upon society.
Depending on the viewpoint taken (equity versus efficiency), one may often
arrive at different policy conclusions. For instance, consider the well-known
Polluter Pays Principle. The question then is whether this principle means that
the polluter should pay the total external cost, through average external cost
pricing, or whether efficient tax rules based on marginal external costs should
be used. The two pricing strategies will normally lead to different outcomes in
terms of both allocative efficiency and equity, unless of course marginal external
costs are constant and are therefore equal to average external costs.
Likewise, estimates of external costs of road transport4 do not lead to unam-
biguous policy implications unless a clear goal for regulation is formulated. From
the viewpoint of environmental quality, this should be the goal of allocative ef-
ficiency. For this goal, one can safely state that additional Pigouvian taxation of
road transport is necessary (Maddison et al., 1996). However, representatives of
for instance the road lobby tend to use equity-based arguments to point out that
road users already pay a lot to society, and that additional economic regulation
is ‘unfair’. This brings us to the social feasibility of regulatory policies, which
will be taken up in the next sub-section.
3.4 The social feasibility of regulating road transport externalities
Figure 55 demonstrates the over 75 years old Pigouvian principle that marginal
external cost pricing will restore the efficient working of the market in case of
market failures through external costs. The diagram considers road transport, and
allows for the joint presence of intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral externalities. The
market equilibrium N 0 is at the intersection of the demand curve, which is equal
to the marginal private and social benefits (D = MPB = MSB)6, and the marginal
private cost curve (MPC). With identical road users, MPC is equal to average
4 Estimates of the external costs of transport show that these are high – for instance ranging from
0.6% to 5.1% of Dutch GDP in the low and high estimates of Bleijenberg et al. (1993), and up to
12% of US GDP (Madisson et al. 1996) and that, given the current policy practices, there seems to
be room for considerable efficiency improvements by means of proper pricing of road transport (see
also Button 1995, for a meta-analytical discussion of estimates of the social costs of transport).
5 The discussion of Fig. 5 draws heavily on Verhoef et al. (1996b).
6 Significant external benefits of road transport are not likely to exist; see Sect. 2. Hence, MPB
and MSB are assumed to be identical in Fig. 5.
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social cost (ASC), and it is positively sloped because of intra-sectoral externalities
such as congestion. Taking account of these intra-sectoral externalities, MSC
represents marginal social costs. Next when accounting also for the marginal
inter-sectoral (e.g., environmental) external costs MEC, TMSC may give the
‘total marginal social costs’. Optimal road usage is then at N ∗, where net social
benefits, given by the area between the curves MPB and TMSC, is maximized,
and the shaded welfare loss is avoided.
Implicit in the identification of N ∗ as ‘optimal’ is the use of the ‘potential
Pareto criterion’. However, this criterion to a considerable extent bypasses issues
of equity, and therewith also the narrowly related issue of ‘social feasibility’ of
regulation. This social feasibility is not so much dependent on the question of
whether society at large benefits from regulation, but rather on the distribution
of such a net welfare improvement among net-winners and net-losers.
This can be illustrated by considering two archetypical instruments for achiev-
ing N ∗ in Fig. 5: a prohibition on mobility between N ∗ and N 0, and the optimal
effluent fee r∗. Let us assume for the moment that both policies succeed in
achieving the Pareto optimum. Optimal regulatory taxation would then result in
the same welfare level as physical regulation for both policies for three groups:
the mobility foregone, the victims of the environmental externality, and of course
also for society at large. However, because total tax revenues abfe necessarily
exceed the reduction in congestion costs abdc, the remaining road users are worse
off. These tax revenues of course accrue to the regulator, or more general, to the
government.
Therefore, although both measures are equally efficient in terms of accom-
plishing N ∗ in this example, they are certainly not equivalent in terms of social
feasibility (see Verhoef et al. 1996b). The road users generating optimal mobil-
ity enjoy a welfare gain with physical regulation because of reduced congestion,
whereas they are worse off with regulatory fees. Since the other groups are likely
to be indifferent between both policies, physical regulation will be more socially
feasible than regulatory taxation.
It is important to emphasize that for this conclusion, the tax revenues are
implicitly assumed to remain with the regulator, and that the various groups in
society do not consider the possibility of benefiting from possible allocations of
these financial means. In theory, it is of course by definition always possible to
construct a lump-sum redistribution of means, including the tax revenues, such
that everyone is better off after optimal regulation. This might, however, involve
taxation of those benefiting from the reduced environmental externality. More-
over, it is evident that difficulties related to, for instance, preference revelation
and heterogeneity of road users may of course prevent actual tax redistribu-
tion schemes, aiming to turn potential Pareto improvements into strict Pareto
improvements, from being practically implementable.
Nevertheless, the allocation of tax revenues is often put forward as one of
the main determinants for the social acceptability of pricing measures. Two main
types of ‘ear-marking’ are tax recycling and investment. Recycling in practice can
take place through the lowering of existing taxes within the road transport sector,
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Fig. 5. Welfare implications of regulating road transport externalities
for instance fixed vehicle taxes or fuel taxes, or outside this sector, for instance
the lowering of distortionary taxes on labour. In particular the former may help
improving the social acceptability of pricing measures (Verhoef et al. 1997a,
provide empirical evidence for this). Investments could for instance take place in
terms of road capacity expansion (see also the Mohring and Harwitz (1962) rule
mentioned in Sect. 3.1), or in terms of public transport. It could be argued that
the latter, through improved public transport services, may reduce the regressive
character of pricing and thus increase the social acceptability. Subsidies to public
transport, although perhaps seemingly contradicting current privatization trends
in many countries, may even be justifiable from an efficiency perspective in
case of scale economies (we owe these observations to an anonymous referee).
Clearly, also combinations of the above mentioned types of tax allocations can be
envisaged. Also in the design of such packages, trade-offs between the allocative
efficiency of the type of ear-marking and the extent to which public acceptance
is enhanced generally will have to be made. A good example is the use of
revenues for lowering taxes on labour. Although this may yield double-dividend
type of efficiency gains, the eventual allocation may often be too far from the
road users’ direct personal interest to induce any significant improvement in the
social acceptability of pricing.
Apart from differing in terms of social feasibility, different regulatory instru-
ments will usually also differ in terms of efficiency. In fact, the above assump-
tion of both instruments achieving optimality is quite unrealistic. This particularly
holds for physical regulation: it is hard to envisage a regulator applying ‘optimal’
physical regulation by identifying and prohibiting the socially excessive mobility
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between N ∗ and N 0. In reality, with physical regulation, the regulator runs the
risk of also affecting mobility with relatively high economic benefits. The reason
is that it will be very hard in practice for a regulator to apply rationing in such
a way that only drivers with a low willingness to pay are excluded from using
the road. Regulation may then even be counter-productive (that is: efficiency-
reducing). Such adverse effects may for instance occur with a physical measure
such as the ‘odd-even numberplates’ regulation used in cities like Athens and
Mexico City.
The trade-off between the efficiency of regulation on the one hand, and its
social feasibility on the other, has come to the forefront as one of the major
issues in contemporary transport policy debates (Verhoef et al. 1996b). Most of
the research into the social and political feasibility of transport policies concerns
the issue of road pricing in the context of congestion regulation (Emmerink et
al. 1995, and Verhoef et al. 1997a, provide surveys), although of course also the
social acceptance of other instruments has been studied (Jones 1995). Central
themes in the literature include the worry that the redistributional effects of road
pricing may dominate the efficiency gains (Evans 1992), and the regressiveness of
road pricing (Richardson 1974; Layard 1977; Arnott et al. 1994). Giuliano (1992),
however, observes that such considerations may merely ‘present an apparently
legitimate basis for opposition that is actually motivated by other reasons’ (p.
349), and Small (1983, 1992b) emphasizes that road pricing may actually be pro-
gressive given certain redistributions of revenues. The same argument of course
holds for other types of Pigouvian regulation.
Finally, the limited social feasibility of regulatory taxes has induced some
research into the possibility of designing socially more feasible economic instru-
ments. Two of such instruments can be mentioned. The first of these is based
on the notion of ‘tradeable permits’. The idea is that a carrying capacity of the
environment can be identified that corresponds to a maximum number of cars
permitted on a certain network, or a maximum of vehicle kilometres allowed.
Usage of a car would then only be permitted if the driver owns a permit allow-
ing her to do so. By organizing then an auction which would lead to the sales
of permits by all initial actors involved to all interested actors, an efficient and
acceptable market solution may be found. The possibility of initially distributing
the permits for free gives the regulator the opportunity to affect the distributional
impacts of the policy in directions that are considered desirable. Secondly, it
may have the psychological advantage of taking away some of the social resis-
tance against economic instruments, based on the sentiment that tax instruments
would primarily serve as a source of revenues for the government. With trade-
able permits initially distributed for free, it is evident to the public at large that
the government will not receive any such revenues. Although there have been
some experiments (Singapore), a more thorough investigation of this opportunity
would be needed. Verhoef et al. (1997b) provide a general discussion of the ap-
plicability of the concept of tradeable permits in the regulation of road transport
externalities; Goddard (1997) investigates the possibility of tradeable permits as
a more cost-effective alternative to a scheme in which car users are confronted
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with interdictions to use their cars at certain days (based on the ‘odd-even’ num-
ber plate method). Secondly, ‘feebates’ have been proposed as a socially more
feasible alternative to regulatory taxes. The aim of such policies is to design
a budget-neutral set of Pigouvian taxes for high externality generators, such as
dirty cars, and subsidies for low externality generators in order to accomplish
a favourable shift towards, for instance, cleaner technologies (see Button and
Rothengatter 1997). This instrument shares the advantage of tradeable permits
that scepticism of road users, about the government using them as a cash-cow,
can be minimized.
4 Conclusion: the policy relevance of benefits and costs of transport
The foregoing sections discussed a number of issues surrounding the evaluation
of the benefits and costs of transport. It was found that transport, for a number of
reasons, cannot be treated as an ‘ordinary’ economic sector, and the implications
of a number of peculiarities were addressed.
For the economic evaluation of the costs and benefits of transport, various
viewpoints can be taken. One of these is the ‘traditional’ economic evaluation,
solely according to the principle of allocative efficiency. The policy rules accord-
ing to this viewpoint are as follows. On the benefit side, it can be observed that
the benefits of transport infrastructure to a considerable extent exhibit non-rivalry
in consumption, in particular at low levels of congestion, and non-excludability,
particularly for road transport and given the cost of exclusion. Given this quasi-
collective character of transport infrastructure, its provision should often indeed
be the responsibility of local, regional, national or trans-national public bodies.
The total benefits of infrastructure investments can be seen as the discounted
stream of the net benefits of its usage, net of the costs of usage. Two important
obstacles in the estimation of these benefits – apart from more common problems
associated with dynamics and uncertainty – are caused by the network environ-
ment of infrastructure, and the derived character of the demand for transport.
This implies that the distinction between generative and distributive effects be-
comes relevant; that the impacts of an investment – which can be positive and
negative – are usually to be found in a much larger area than merely the link
directly involved; and that one actually would have to have knowledge on the
dynamic spatial behaviour of the economy involved to assess the benefits of such
an investment. However, although the benefits of an investment of infrastructure
are often to be reaped in other economic sectors, other than transport itself, these
benefits do not constitue Pareto relevant externalities: there is no a priori reason
to believe that market forces would not be able to realize the benefits of in-
frastructure improvements. On the cost side, in contrast, externalities actually do
prevent the market from attaining allocative efficiency. Optimal Pigouvian taxes
can be established, based on the marginal external costs at the individual level,
implying that ‘intra-sectoral’ externalities, such as congestion, should indeed also
be accounted for.
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Notwithstanding the economic appeal of the criterion of allocative efficiency,
considerations related to equity impacts and social feasibility are often at least
as important in policy making. Also from this perspective, transport turns out to
be a complicated sector. Considering the benefits of infrastructure investments,
it can be observed that, in contrast to many other types of public investments,
where often only ‘winners’ and ‘non-affected’ are involved, transport infrastruc-
ture improvements are likely to cause some groups to be better off, but also
some to be worse off, where the incidence of gains and losses over different
interest groups will generally vary over space. Accessibility is both an absolute
and a relative concept. Therefore, spatial and sectoral equity considerations are
therefore likely to be important determinants for the viability of infrastructure
policies, and investments that may be warranted from an efficiency point of view
may often be unacceptable to certain groups in society. For the regulation of
road transport externalities, it turns out that the most efficient policies, based on
the Pigouvian principle, are usually the least popular ones. Also here, regulators
will often have to make trade-offs between the efficiency and social feasibility
of regulation. Another source of tension between efficiency and equity consid-
erations concerns the different policy conclusions that can be drawn depending
on the viewpoint taken. Unfortunately, there often does not seem to be a clear
correspondence between what is efficient, and what is socially equitable. The
economic analyst will have to accept that, despite the stance taken in textbook
economic policy evaluation, the former is only one of the relevant inputs in the
process of policy making, and the social feasibility and equity implications may
often dominate public decision making on transport policies. The provision of
evaluation frameworks that are capable of consistently dealing with both of these
sides to the benefits and costs of transport probably offers one of the greatest
challenges in transport policy analysis.
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